A scoped review of what you copy, where it lives, who can reach it, and the last time anyone proved a restore
Ransomware crews now go after the backup and the hypervisor, not only the file server. A green job in the backup console is not evidence you can recover. Insurers and boards are starting to ask for the restore test, not the logo on the appliance.
We do not need you to replace the product you already bought. We need to know whether it would survive the same week as the production systems, and whether anyone besides the one admin can run a restore.
What is in backup, what is not, and what sits only on a laptop or a single NAS. Include Microsoft 365, line-of-business apps, and the hypervisor if you run one.
Offline, immutable, or air-gapped copies. Domain-admin credentials that can wipe both production and backup in one night are a finding, not a footnote.
A dated restore of a named system, with time-to-recover written down. We can watch or facilitate. We do not accept “it should work” as the answer.